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I. INTRODUCTION
T seems that a handful of Texas partnership cases surface each year.
In some years, particularly in the recent past as the real estate indus-
try (which utilizes the partnership as the predominant investment ve-
hicle) suffered through hard times, many of the partnership law cases
were decided in the bankruptcy courts. Occasionally there is a partner-
ship law case or partnership legislation that is important to the state's
jurisprudence.
It would be difficult to categorize any of the cases discussed in this
article as "important," although some certainly are informative and nota-
ble. It was anticipated that there would be 1995 legislation to discuss;
however, a political difference of opinion submarined the entire "Busi-
ness Organizations Bill," which was not substantively controversial.' Be-
cause the bill is expected to be re-introduced, probably without change, in
the 1997 session, pertinent portions of that legislation are briefly
discussed.
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas, Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
1. H.B. 1425, 75th Leg., C.S. (1995).
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For the reader's convenience, the cases are grouped under topical
headings corresponding to the most important partnership law aspect of
the case.
II. CASES
A. EXISTENCE OF PARTNERSHIP; DETERMINATION OF
PARTNER STATUS
One issue that generates a fair amount of litigation is the determination
of whether a partnership exists. The issue arises in two principal con-
texts: (1) a person asserting that another is the first person's partner
(either to have someone with whom to share liabilities or from whom
profits can be obtained), and (2) assertion by a third party that a partner-
ship exists between or among others with whom the third party has con-
ducted business (usually in an effort to impose liability on someone who
claims not to be another's partner). A related issue is whether a particu-
lar person who has a relationship with a partnership is a partner in that
partnership.
Brazosport Bank of Texas v. Oak Park Townhouses.2
This case, which involved a loan by Brazosport Bank to Oak Park
Townhouses, contained a number of issues; only the partnership issues,
however, will be discussed.
In responding to the borrower's claim that Brazosport breached a fidu-
ciary duty owed to the borrower, the court first had to determine whether
a joint venture existed between the two. The borrower based its argu-
ment that a joint venture existed on the fact that the lender obtained an
assignment of a profits interest in the borrower's project as additional
consideration for its loan. The borrower's claim implicated a peculiar
Texas rule that, to find the existence of a joint venture, the parties must
agree to share losses.3
The four elements required to establish a joint venture under Texas law
are: (1) community of interest in the venture, (2) an agreement to share
profits, (3) an agreement to share losses, and (4) a mutual right of control
over management of the enterprise. 4
A joint venture does not exist if any of these four elements is missing.
Here, the borrower argued that an agreement to share losses could be
implied from an agreement to share profits, basing its assertion on the
authority of Austin v. Truly5 and Couder v. Gomez.6 However, unlike
here, in Truly and Couder there was an express joint venture relationship,
and the court in Brazosport refused to bootstrap a finding of a joint ven-
ture by implying an agreement to share losses. 7
2. 889 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
3. Id. at 682.
4. Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. 1978).
5. 721 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986), aff'd, 744 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1988).
6. 378 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1964).
7. 889 S.W.2d at 683.
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Because the parties were not partners, the court could not find a fiduci-
ary relationship and the consequent duties unless it concluded that there
existed a "special relationship between Brazosport and the borrower."'8
The borrower argued that such a relationship existed because of the link
between the bank and partnership which the borrower said resulted from
a previous relationship wherein a Brazosport director had once been a
partner of the borrower. The court disagreed 9 and found that all perti-
nent provisions and relationships were fully disclosed to all partners at
the time they chose to become partners.' 0 No harm, no foul, whatever
the theory.
Grimmett v. Higginbotham."
In this partnership existence case the court cited Coastal Plains Devel-
opment Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., discussed above, in identifying the elements
of a partnership. 12
Although it is not unusual for one partner to provide capital and the
other to provide services, other factors controlled here: in the absence of
a written agreement defining a partnership relationship, and with the
working partner receiving weekly compensation, and in the absence of an
expressed agreement to share profits or losses, the appellate court had
little difficulty overturning the trial judge's finding of a partnership. In-
stead, the court found an employer-employee relationship.
B. LIMITED PARTNER LIABILITY
Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd.13
The partnership issue' 4 in this case involved a claim by the plaintiff that
one of the defendants, Lawson, although expressly a limited partner in
the defendant limited partnership, MTL, should have the liability of a
general partner. The plaintiff's claim was that although Lawson was em-
ployed at MTL, he controlled all aspects of MTL's business. Further, the
plaintiff reasonably believed that Lawson was the general partner of
MTL-from what she could see, Lawson did not report to another per-
8. Id. Texas common law recognizes that "confidential relationships may arise not
only from the technical fiduciary relationships such as attorney-client ... partner and part-
ner, etc.-which as a matter of law are relationships of trust and confidence-but may arise
informally from 'moral, social, domestic or purely personal' relationships." Thigpen v.
Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1963).
9. The Court dismissed the line of cases cited by the plaintiff, finding that the cases
would apply to an allegation that fiduciary duties had been breached, but could not be
relied on to find a fiduciary relationship. 889 S.W.2d at 684.
10. Id. at 685.
11. 907 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, writ denied).
12. Id. at 2. Curiously, and perhaps the most interesting thing about the case, the
court cited the same elements in its analysis of whether there was a partnership as other
cases have looked to in determining whether a "joint venture" exists. Established, if pecu-
liar, Texas law injects the element of sharing of losses in determining the existence of a
joint venture, but not necessarily in determining the existence of a partnership. Why that
distinction was not observed here cannot be determined from the opinion.
13. 893 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
14. The case dealt mostly with plaintiff's claims of employment-related torts allegedly
committed by the defendant.
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son, he had control of all aspects of MTL's business and he never referred
to himself as a limited partner.' 5
The court cited the relevant provisions of the Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act ("TRLPA"): 16
(1) A limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited part-
nership unless the limited partner is also a general partner or participates
in the control of the business in addition to exercising its rights as a lim-
ited partner. 17
(2) If a limited partner does participate in control, it is liable only to
persons who transact business with the partnership who "reasonably be-
lieve," based on the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is
a general partner.18
(3) A limited partner is not considered to participate in the control of
the business by possessing certain rights or acting in certain capacities,
including "acting as a contractor for or an agent or employee of the lim-
ited partnership or of a general partner, an officer, director, or stock-
holder of a corporate general partner, or a partner of a partnership that is
a general partner of the limited partnership.' 19
The court concluded that there were enough fact issues on whether
Lawson conducted himself as a general partner to preclude a summary
judgment in his favor. It is difficult to predict what the court would have
done if the procedural posture of the case had been other than a sum-
mary judgment proceeding. Presumably, the written limited partnership
agreement did not take advantage of the TRLPA section 3.03(b) safe har-
bor provision to protect Lawson by defining his "hands-on" role.20
The plaintiff also argued that the corporate general partner of MTL
was Lawson's alter ego, making him liable as general partner. To support
that claim, plaintiff noted that Lawson was the corporation's sole share-
holder, that the corporation was severely undercapitalized, that it derived
all of its income from the operations of MTL and paid a number of Law-
son's personal expenses. In the summary judgment context, the court
again found enough fact issues to preclude summary judgment for de-
fendant Lawson.2'
C. FIDUCIARY DUTY
A long-standing hallmark of the partnership relationship is the exist-
ence of fiduciary duties. The statutory support for the existence of fiduci-
15. 893 F. Supp. at 689.
16. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 (Vernon Supp. 1996) [hereinafter
TRLPA].
17. TRLPA § 3.03(a).
18. TRLPA § 3.03(a).
19. TRLPA § 3.03(b)(1); 893 F. Supp. at 688.
20. Section 3.03(b)(8)(K) gives a limited partner a safe harbor from liability as a gen-
eral partner for proposing, approving, disapproving, by vote or otherwise, any matters
stated in the partnership agreement.
21. 893 F. Supp. at 689.
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ary duties is more cryptic than explicit. The Texas Uniform Partnership
Act's ("TUPA") only use of the term is in the caption of Section 21,
which obligates every partner to account to the partnership for any bene-
fit, and hold as trustee any profits derived by the partner without the
consent of the other partners, from any transaction connected with for-
mation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership.22 Nevertheless, Texas
common law is well-established that strong fiduciary duties are owed by
general partners to each other, to their partnership and to limited
partners. 23
In the general partnership context, the Texas legislature acted to
change this fiduciary framework in 1993, when it implemented the Texas
Revised Partnership Act 24 ("TRPA"), which became effective January 1,
1994 for partnerships created after December 31, 1993 (and for pre-ex-
isting partnerships that elected to be governed by the TRPA). TRPA sec-
tion 4.04 defines the "general standards of a partner's conduct" in terms
of a partner's duties owed to the partnership and the other partners to
be: (i) a duty of loyalty, and (ii) a duty of care. Section 4.04(f) states that
a partner is not a trustee and is not held to the same standard as a trustee.
This provision intends to align the statutory duties with modem expecta-
tions-the statutory narrowing of these duties recognizes that partner-
ships are, for tax purposes, used in business settings in which corporations
might have been used in the past, and the duties of owners/managers
should be comparable. The partnership committee bill analysis of the
statute clearly states that elimination from the statute of reference to the
term "fiduciary" was intended and that movement toward a "business
judgment rule" standard between general partners was intended. 25 It ap-
pears from the next case that the Supreme Court of Texas did not get that
message.
M. R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell.26
This was a per curiam opinion, replacing the prior opinion of the Texas
Supreme Court. The case involved a dispute between two former part-
ners in which the dispositive issue was whether the trial court correctly
construed the jury verdict. The court of appeals held that the trial court
did not, but the Supreme Court disagreed (at least on rehearing). 27
The opinion in this case is somewhat unfulfilling-on the one hand, for
a very short opinion, there is a lot of substance packed into it; on the
other hand, important questions are left unanswered and key legal con-
cepts are confused. A chronology of events will frame the discussion:
22. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 21 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (entitled "Part-
ner Accountable as a Fiduciary" [hereinafter TUPA]).
23. See, e.g., Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d (Tex. 1976); Johnson v. Peckham,
132 Tex. 148, 120 S.W.2d 786 (1938).
24. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-1-1.01-.06 (Vernon Supp. 1995) [hereinafter
TRPA].
25. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 61326 cmt. (Vernon Supp. 1996) [hereinafter Part-
nership Committee Comments].




1/86 - Mizell and Champion, as partners, contracted to provide
services to Northwestern Resources.2 8
12/86 - Champion negotiated a second one-year contract with
Northwestern under the name M.R. Champion, Inc., but
assured Mizell that they would still be partners.2 9
1/87 - Northwestern barred Mizell from its premises for taking
some of its property; Champion worked for Northwestern
during 1987, using equipment leased from Mizell.30
12/87 - Champion negotiated a three-year contract with Northwest-
ern.
31
1/88 - Champion told Mizell the partnership was over.32
The only claim, of a number that Mizell asserted, on which the case was
tried was that Champion breached his fiduciary duty by not obtaining the
three-year contract with Northwestern for the benefit of the Mizell-
Champion partnership.33
The Supreme Court primarily evaluated the court of appeals' analysis
of the trial court's determination of the legal effect of the jury's findings.
Champion contended that the partnership "terminated" in January 1987
because of Mizell's misconduct toward their partnership's customer,
Northwestern, and therefore Champion had no duty to refer new busi-
ness opportunities (namely, the three-year contract) to the partnership.
Mizell asserted that the partnership was not "dissolved" until Champion
stated that the partnership was "over" in January 1988, which allegedly
resulted in Champion breaching a continuing fiduciary duty when he ob-
tained the three-year contract. (The court's use of the terms "terminated"
and "dissolved," apparently interchangeably, is a frustrating example of a
long-term failure of courts and practitioners to make the important dis-
tinction between the two concepts.) 34
The jury's findings included: (i) that Champion breached his fiduciary
duty to Mizell and to the partnership (the jury was not asked to find when
that breach occurred), and (ii) that after Mizell was barred from North-
western's premises in January 1987, he breached the partnership agree-
ment and was guilty of conduct that made it "not reasonably practicable
to carry on partnership business. '35
The trial court concluded, based on this latter finding (which intends to
invoke TUPA section 32(1)(d), which allows judicial dissolution when a
partner's conduct makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on busi-
28. Id. at 617-18.
29. Id. at 618.
30. Id.
31. 904 S.W. 2d at 618.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Dissolution is a change in the relationship of the partners, usually caused by a
partner's separation from the partnership, while termination is the end of the partnership's
legal existence. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 473, 1471 (6th ed. 1990).
35. 904 S.W.2d at 618.
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ness with him),36 that the partnership "terminated" in January 1987,
which was before the breach of fiduciary duty claimed by Mizell (remem-
ber, his complaint centered on the three-year contract that was not struck
until late 1987).
The trial court found for the defendants, but the court of appeals re-
versed and rendered in favor of Mizell, reasoning that the jury's finding
that Champion breached his fiduciary duty necessarily included the find-
ing that the partnership continued through December 1987, when the
only damages claimed by Mizell occurred. 37 The Texas Supreme Court
said that the court of appeals was incorrect because whether Champion
still had a duty to Mizell in December 1987 was a legal determination for
the court, not a factual determination for the jury. The legal determina-
tion, the court said, could be made based on the jury's finding regarding
Mizell's improper conduct in January 1987, coupled with the trial court's
finding that the partnership terminated. In the court's words: "The jury's
finding that Champion breached his fiduciary duty does not control the
legal determination of whether such duty existed; the finding concerning
Mizell's conduct does."38
Among the noteworthy aspects of this case are the following:
(1) Although the case was tried under and governed by the TUPA,
(article 6132b) and not by the TRPA, which became effective Janu-
ary 1, 1994 for partnerships formed after December 31, 1993 (or that
elected to become subject to the new statute), the court held that the
principles that applied to this case were the same under both statutes. In
following that thought, the court cited TRPA sections 4.04 and 4.05 for
the following proposition: "Partners owe each other and their partner-
ship a duty in the nature of a fiduciary duty in the conduct and winding up
of partnership business, and are liable for a breach of that duty."'39 (Em-
phasis added) In one stroke of its pen, the Court may have undone the
effort of the Texas Legislature to remove fiduciary duty, as such, from the
general partnership act.40
(2) After citing to the new TRPA, the court (almost as if trying to
identify authorities as chronologically remote to each other as possible)
cited Rice v. Angell4' for the proposition that after a partnership termi-
nates, a partner's duty is limited to matters relating to the winding up of
the partnership's affairs. In particular, the court said that that person has
no duty to offer to his former partners a business opportunity that arises
after the partnership is terminated. The last statement is true enough, but
the court's earlier reference to "winding up" after "termination" (rather
36. Again, the court chose the comparable provision of the new, but technically inap-
plicable TRPA, by referring to TRPA § 6.01, Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 619.
39. Id. at 618.
40. See Partnership Committee Comments, supra note 25.
41. 73 Tex. 350, 11 S.W. 338 (1889).
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than after "dissolution") is unfortunate.42
(3) The court made no effort to distinguish among the concepts "disso-
lution," "winding up" and "termination." In fact, the court refers to
"winding up" occurring after "termination." The progression under the
TUPA is: Dissolution... Winding Up... Termination.43
Fiduciary duties exist after dissolution and during winding up, but not
after termination (which ends the legal existence of the partnership after
winding up occurs to settle accounts with creditors and among partners).
It is important to maintain the distinction between dissolution and termi-
nation, and the court's failure to do so is disappointing (and, one might
assume, partly a result of the lawyers' failure to make the distinction). 44
D. PROCEDURE-DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Bankston v. Burch45
This was a suit by a limited partner (a Texas citizen) against a general
partner (a California citizen). The issue in the case was whether a limited
partnership is an "indispensable" party for diversity jurisdiction purposes,
where the suit is "derivative" in nature. For diversity jurisdiction pur-
poses (under Carden v. Arkoma Associates46) a partnership is considered
a citizen of every state in which a general or limited partner is a citizen,
meaning that the limited partnership here was a citizen of both Texas and
California. 47 Plaintiff sued defendant (in his individual capacity, not as a
representative of the partnership) in state court, without joining the lim-
ited partnership, for fraud and negligent misrepresentation with respect
to the limited partnership. Defendant removed the case to federal court,
and then on the eve of trial filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that plain-
tiff had failed to join the limited partnership and the limited partners as
"indispensable parties" under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19. The district court
nevertheless proceeded to trial, and the jury held for plaintiff on some
claims. Plaintiff then filed a motion for j.n.o.v. for the claims that were
denied and acknowledged that some of his claims against defendant were
"derivative" in nature. Eventually, the district court entered judgment
against defendant and defendant appealed, claiming that the district court
42. This is not a proper use of the term "terminates." Under well-established law,
partners owe duties to one another after dissolution through winding up until termination.
(See, e.g., TUPA § 30: "On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues
until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.") After termination, there are no
further duties owed.
43. TUPA § 30.
44. The TRPA eliminates the term "dissolution" and some of the difficulties that it has
presented, as exemplified above. Instead, the TRPA speaks of "events of withdrawal" (of a
partner) and "events that require a winding up" (of the partnership). At least in partner-
ships with more than two partners, the bias of the TRPA favors continuation, not winding
up, but includes a statutory mechanism to deal with the partner who suffered an event of
withdrawal (through a "redemption" or buy out of the withdrawn partner's interest in the
partnership). See, e.g., TRPA § 7.01.
45. 27 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 1994).
46. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
47. 27 F.3d at 169.
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had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment on a derivative
claim.48
The court noted that limited partners can, if permitted by statute, sue
"derivatively" to enforce rights belonging to the partnership; because the
partnership possesses the rights to be enforced, it is, at a minimum, the
real party in interest in a derivative lawsuit. 49
The court held that the limited partnership was "even more than the
real party in interest-it is an indispensable party without whom the law-
suit should not have gone forward."'50 The court then listed the following
four factors from Federal Rule 19(b) as relevant to the determination of
whether a party is indispensable: (1) the extent to which a judgment ren-
dered in the party's absence might be prejudicial to that party or others in
the lawsuit; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judg-
ment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be
lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the party's ab-
sence will be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff will have an ade-
quate remedy if the party cannot be joined.51 The court held that these
factors, particularly that a judgment will prejudice the partnership's rights
and that shaping the relief provided inadequate protection to the partner-
ship's interest, favored holding that the limited partnership was an indis-
pensable party.52
The court noted that under Carden the citizenship of all partners, lim-
ited as well as general, controls the citizenship of the limited partnership
itself, even if this results in there never being diversity jurisdiction in a
suit by a partner against the partnership. Applying Carden, the court
held that because the plaintiff was a citizen of Texas and the limited part-
nership (also a Texas citizen via plaintiff) was an indispensable party de-
fendant for Plaintiff's derivative claim, there was no complete diversity of
citizenship.53
The court made it clear that one cannot manufacture diversity jurisdic-
tion by failing to join a non-diverse, but indispensable, party.54 Here, that
indispensable party was the partnership, based on the derivative nature of
the claims being asserted. The court admitted that its refusal to carve
exceptions from Carden "effectively closes the doors of the federal courts
to many lawsuits among partners or by partners against a partnership.
' 55
Mallia v. PaineWebber Incorporated56
This case involved, in a slightly different setting, the same basic issue as
Bankston v. Burch in the context of a fraud suit by limited partners
48. Id. at 166-67.
49. The Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act expressly allows derivative suits. See
TRLPA § 10.
50. 27 F.3d at 167.




55. 27 F.3d at 168-69.
56. 889 F. Supp. 277 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
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against the sellers of their limited partnership units-what is the effect,
under Carden, on a determination of complete diversity of the presence
(or absence) of the limited partnership in the suit?
Plaintiffs bought partnership units in two limited partnerships, and
sued the defendants (who included the limited partnerships) for securities
fraud, saying that this investment was unsuitable for them and that they
were induced to purchase units by the defendants' fraudulent misrepre-
sentations and omissions.5 7 Plaintiffs brought suit in state court, and de-
fendants removed to federal court. Plaintiffs claimed that the case must
be returned to state court for a lack of complete diversity that resulted
from the limited partnerships' being Texas residents, under Carden.
The court discussed the Carden rule, covered in detail supra, that a
limited partnership must be counted as a resident, for diversity jurisdic-
tion purposes, of every state in where each limited partner resides. Thus,
the court found that Carden would preclude diversity jurisdiction here.
But, that did not end the matter-the court said that it had to consider
subject matter jurisdiction, and determine the nature of the claims.58
The Court noted that there were no Fifth Circuit opinions that involved
non-derivative limited partner claims, and in a footnote, stated that "sev-
eral comments by the Fifth Circuit strongly suggest that it will follow
other courts in making this distinction," and cited Bankston (noting that
in Bankston the Fifth Circuit "followed Carden by specifying that the
facts before it were specifically limited to derivative claims"). 59 The court
then said: "the "overwhelming development of judicial opinions in the
post-Carden environment clearly indicates that courts are not willing to
follow Carden's directive when a plaintiff's claims are of a direct, rather
than a derivative, nature. '60 The court said that well-settled law allowed
a limited partner to pursue one of three types of claims against the gen-
eral partners of the limited partnership for alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties or other wrongdoings: (1) an individual, direct claim; (2) a direct
claim against the general partners through a representative action, such
as a class action lawsuit; or (3) a derivative suit on behalf of the partner-
ship itself.61
Therefore, because the Plaintiff's suit was "direct" instead of "deriva-
tive," the court held that the Carden rule did not apply, and overruled
plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court. The court stated that
its reading of relevant case law after Carden strongly suggests that when a
plaintiff's claims are direct in nature (particularly when they are brought,
as here, as a class action) the limited partnership will not be considered
an indispensable party under Federal Rule 19, and will not be considered
57. Id at 279.
58. Id. at 281.
59. Id. at 281 n.2.
60. Id. at 281.
61. 889 F. Supp. at 281 (citing Lenz v. Associates Inns and Restaurants Co. of Am.,
833 F. Supp. 362, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Curley v. Brignoli, Curley & Roberts Assoc.,
915 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 955 (1991)).
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in a court's analysis of diversity jurisdiction. Rather, the court held that
the limited partnerships were merely "nominal" rather than "indispensa-
ble" parties, and overruled the motion for remand. 62 The court did, how-
ever, note the existence of class action litigation involving the same
partnerships in New York, and ordered the parties to respond to its sua
sponte motion to consolidate the case with that class action litigation.63
Bankston and Mallia can be reconciled as follows: Where a partner
(limited or general) sues another partner or third party (and the partner-
ship is joined as a defendant), whether Carden can be used to defeat di-
versity jurisdiction (i.e., no complete diversity) depends on the nature of
the suit-if it is "derivative," it can, and if "direct," it cannot.
E. AUTHORITY OF PARTNER
FDIC v. Enventure64
This summary judgment case involved an attempt by non-signatory
general partners of a limited partnership, in an FDIC suit on a promissory
note, to avoid liability for the partnership's note debt based on a lack of
authority of the solitary signatory general partner to bind the partnership.
The FDIC (plaintiff) was appointed receiver of a bank in 1987, and
filed suit in 1993 against Enventure (a limited partnership) and Horton
and Daniels (general partners of Enventure). The FDIC sued to collect
on a promissory note executed by Chambers, another general partner of
Enventure, in 1986. Defendants claimed that Chambers was not author-
ized to execute the note on behalf of Enventure. The court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the FDIC.65
The court began its analysis by noting that "[u]nder Section 10 of the
Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act, in effect at the time of these
transactions, a general partner of a limited partnership has all of the
rights and powers and is subject to all of the restrictions and liabilities of
a partner without limited partners."66 This led the court to Section 9 of
the TUPA, which provides that
[e]very partner is an agent of the partnership for the purposes of its
business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the
partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in
the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a mem-
ber binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no
authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the
person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has
no such authority. 67
Therefore, the court concluded, the partnership was bound by the gen-
eral partner's execution of the note, unless Chambers had no authority to
62. 889 F.2d at 283.
63. Id. at 283-84.
64. 868 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
65. Id. at 873.




execute the note on behalf of the limited partnership and the bank, and
the FDIC had knowledge of that lack of authority.68
The defendants' first claimed that their partnership agreement, which
apparently was in the possession of the bank (although the defendants
failed to prove this in the litigation) did not authorize Chambers alone to
execute the note, because it required all four general partners to act col-
lectively to bind the partnership. Therefore, they argued, the note was
unenforceable against the partnership (and them, the other general part-
ners). That was probably all true. However, the FDIC provided suffi-
cient summary judgment evidence to support its claim that the
partnership agreement was not in its possession, and the court held that
under Texas law the FDIC did not have the requisite knowledge of
Chambers' lack of authority.69
Adding insult to injury, the court also found that the D'Oench doctrine
(from D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDICO), and its so-called codifica-
tion,71 were independently sufficient to defeat the defendants' claim. The
D'Oench doctrine (1) bars defenses or claims against federal regulators
where a financial institution enters into an oral or a so-called "secret"
agreement with a borrower that alters the terms of an existing unqualified
obligation, and (2) precludes enforcement of any defense or claim upon a
written agreement that is not found within the financial institution's
records covering the financial transactions at issue.72
Even if the partnership agreement had been in the files of the FDIC,
the court found that the agreement still would "run afoul" of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) (the codification of the D'Oench doctrine). Section 1823(e) al-
lows the FDIC to avoid any agreement that diminishes the FDIC's inter-
est in any asset acquired by it as a receiver unless the agreement: "(1) is
in writing; (2) was executed by the depository institution and the obligor
contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the institution;(3) was approved by the depository institution's board of directors or its
loan committee... ; and (4) has been continuously an official record of the
depository institution. ' 73 The court found that the partnership agree-
ment "clearly did not meet the parameters of § 1823(e)," and could there-
fore not be used as a defense to the FDIC's claims, because (1) it was
neither executed by the bank nor approved by the bank's board or loan
committee; and (2) it was not executed by Enventure's general partners
"contemporaneously" with the note (it was executed four years before
the note was executed). 74 This was one circumstance where, to be fair,
the bank's failure to exercise due diligence probably should not have
been held against the FDIC. There are, of course, dozens of other cases
68. Id.
69. 868 F. Supp. at 875.
70. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1989).





where D'Oench or section 1823(e) have served to frustrate a borrower's
reasonable expectations.
The case also involved some interesting guaranty issues. The court de-
nied the defendants' guaranty defenses and then, for good measure, de-
nied their statute of limitations argument (after all, the FDIC beat the
expanded 6-year statute's deadline by a good 1 minute, 20 seconds!). 75
F. PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT CONTROLS RELATIONSHIP
B&R Communications v. Lopez76
In this case, the minority partners (plaintiffs) sued the 68% majority
partner (defendant) alleging material breaches of and defaults under the
partnership agreement, including the use of partnership funds to engage
in predatory litigation (resulting in large legal expenses to the plaintiff's
pecuniary disadvantage). During discovery, plaintiffs sought records of
all litigation commenced or threatened by defendant. Defendant fur-
nished all records except the correspondence and files of the partner-
ship's attorney relating to pending litigation (one of which involved a case
presently on appeal in which defendant won a big judgment). The trial
judge allowed defendant to withhold certain items and plaintiffs initiated
this mandamus proceeding to compel production.77
The partnership agreement limited the right of inspection in only two
ways: (1) inspection must be done at reasonable times and during busi-
ness hours only, and (2) inspection must not "unreasonably interfere"
with the partnership's operation.78 The court held that the agreed, con-
tractual standard rendered the discovery requirement of "relevancy" in-
applicable to plaintiffs' request to inspect the records. The court also
held that the fact that partners placed the complete and exclusive power
to conduct the partnership's affairs in the executive committee was irrele-
vant to the plaintiffs' request for the records because they were merely
asking to inspect records, not trying to conduct the business of the
partnership.79
The court struck down defendant's "global" claim that giving the
records to the plaintiffs would "unreasonably interfere" with the partner-
ship's operations (defendant argued that turning over the records could
hurt the partnership's chances of retaining its judgment in the case on
appeal), because defendant made no showing that this was true.80 The
court also held that the fact that the partners contracted in the partner-
ship agreement not to disclose or make available "confidential" informa-
tion of the partnership without the consent of the partnership's executive
committee, did not limit plaintiffs' right to examine and inspect the part-
75. id. at 877.
76. 890 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
77. Id at 226.
78. Id.




nership records, and thus did not preclude examination of this "confiden-
tial" information. 81 Without stating directly, the court clearly felt that the
limitations contained in the partnership agreement were intended to pre-
clude disclosure to third parties of confidential partnership information.
Therefore, even though the defendant apparently did not trust the plain-
tiffs' use of confidential information, the contract expressed in the part-
nership agreement did not allow the defendant to withhold the
information here.
Finally, the court held that because a protective order was in place
preventing disclosure of proprietary information, the alleged proprietary
nature of the requested records did not preclude plaintiffs from examin-
ing the records, despite defendant's claim that the plaintiffs (who were
also active in the partnership's area of business) might use the informa-
tion requested to their advantage and to the partnership's detriment.82
G. TAX MATTERS PARTNER
Medical & Business Facilities Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Internal Revenue83
The question in this appeal of a tax court finding in favor of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service was whether a general partner (who is not the tax
matters partner ("TMP")84 has either actual or apparent authority to exe-
cute, in favor of the IRS, consents extending the period of limitations.
Here, a partnership filed a protest contesting that income tax adjust-
ments were barred by limitations. Brooks, one of the general partners
who was not the TMP of the partnership, signed several consents ex-
tending the period of limitations (the "Consents") despite not being au-
thorized in writing by the partnership. 85 The Internal Revenue Code
provides that the limitations period may be extended by an agreement
signed by a partnership's tax matters partner or "any other person au-
thorized by the partnership in writing to enter into such an agreement. 86
(Emphasis added). Therefore, because Brooks was not the TMP and was
not authorized in writing to sign the Consents, the Fifth Circuit, reversing
the United States Tax Court, held that the Consents were invalid. 87
The court of appeals noted that partnership agreements (because they
are "in writing") have been held to provide general partners with actual
authority to execute documents like the Consents where those agree-
ments expressly granted the general partners broad authority to act for
the partnership.88 The court then held that the partnership agreement
here did not contain such a broad grant of authority to any individual
partner, because it required collective decision-making that included the
81. 890 S.W. 2d at 228-29.
82. Id. at 229.
83. 60 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 1995).
84. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7) (1986).
85. 60 F.3d at 209.
86. I.R.C. § 6229(b)(1)(B).
87. 60 F.3d at 212.
88. Id. at 210.
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other general partners. Therefore, the Consents were not valid.8 9 To
summarize, the Fifth Circuit held that: (1) the partnership agreement did
not give the general partner actual authority to execute Consents to ex-
tend the limitations period applicable to the partnership; (2) the general
partner did not have apparent authority to execute Consents to extend
the period of limitations; and (3) because designation of a partner as the
partnership's tax matters partner must be filed with the I.R.S., the I.R.S.
cannot reasonably rely on a representation of one of several general part-
ners as to his status as tax matters partner.
III. LEGISLATION
As noted in the Introduction above, the Texas Business Law Founda-
tion included in its 1995 legislative package a "Business Organizations
Bill," that amended portions of several business organization statutes, in-
cluding the Texas Business Corporation Act, the Texas Limited Liability
Company Act, the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act and the Texas
Revised Partnership Act.90 As noted, politics intervened and the legisla-
tion was not passed. But, because the legislation will be re-introduced in
1997, it might be useful to identify the most important partnership statute
changes.
A. LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
Among the changes proposed to the TRLPA are the following:
1. Conversions. Each of the four statutes listed above will be amended
to include a "conversion" right that will allow any corporation, limited
liability company, limited partnership or general partnership to convert
into any of the other forms by following a relatively simple procedure of
filing a plan of conversion. 91 Amendments are being made to each stat-
ute to accommodate that concept.
2. LLC Membership. Section 3.03(b)(1) of the TRLPA is proposed to
be amended to clarify that acting as a member or manager of an LLC or
in a similar capacity with another person that is a general partner, does
not constitute taking part in control of the business of a limited partner-
ship (comparable to acting as officer or director of a corporate general
partner).92
3. Limited Partner Withdrawal Right. Section 6.03 of the TRLPA is
proposed to be amended to reverse the statutory presumption that a lim-
ited partner may withdraw on 6 month's notice.93 Partners could still
grant a limited partner the right to withdraw in the partnership agree-
ment. The presumption was contrary to most parties' expectations and
89. Id.
90. H.B. 1425, 74th Leg., C.S. (1995).
91. Id § 20.
92. Id. § 92.
93. Id. § 93.
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caused problems in the family limited partnership area (a "lapsed right/
valuation" issue).
4. Continuation Without Dissolution on General Partner Withdrawal.
The TRLPA currently provides that a limited partnership dissolves when
a general partner ceases to be a general partner, but allows reconstitution
in certain cases in which there is at least one other general partner, or
another is appointed.94 This is proposed to be amended to conform to
the TRPA provisions on dissolution by providing that a limited partner-
ship may continue without dissolution if at least one other general partner
remains or is appointed.95
B. GENERAL PARTNERSHIPS
Among the changes proposed to the TRPA are the following:
1. Conversion. The same type of conversion provisions added to the
other business organization statutes are added here.
2. Registered Limited Liability Partnership. Sections 3.05 and 3.08
would be amended to make explicit the specific limitation on liability pro-
vided to partners in registered limited liability partnerships in certain
cases.96 This provision overrides more general provisions creating liabil-
ity for partners in requiring them to share losses through a contribution
obligation. Also, Section 8.06 would be amended to make explicit that a
partner who is not liable for a partnership debt or obligation (whether by
agreement of the creditor or because the partnership is a registered lim-
ited liability partnership) is not required to contribute funds to enable the
partnership to pay those obligations or to reimburse liable partners who
have paid them.97 This result is implicit under existing law, but is being
clarified. Similar changes were made to the federal Bankruptcy Code in
Chapter 7 liquidations.
94. TRLPA § 8.01.
95. H.B. 1425 § 94.
96. Id §§ 105-106.
97. Id § 112.
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